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Analysis | Trump's Deal with Morocco is a Loss for the Sahrawi — and an Opportunity for Biden

Analysis | Trump's Deal with Morocco is a Loss for the Sahrawi — and an Opportunity for Biden

Trump's recognition of Moroccan control over Western Sahara in exchange for Moroccan recognition of Israel was an unnecessary U.S. concession and a loss for the Sahrawi’s independence movement — but could prove an opportunity for the Biden administration.


 

On December 10, 2020, then-U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Morocco and Israel had agreed to normalize relations, making Morocco the first country in North Africa and the fourth Arab state this year to normalize relations with Israel. Yet the agreement may also come at a severe loss for the Sahrawi people: as part of the deal, the United States agreed to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed region of Western Sahara, becoming the first foreign country to adopt the stance and overturning a longstanding U.S. policy on the territory, once described as “Africa’s last colony.” 

President Trump’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara — crowned by the future establishment of a U.S. consulate in the Western Saharan city of Dakhla — impairs the Saharawi cause for independence and writes off decades of U.S. commitment to find a solution to the conflict that takes into account the interests of both parties. Nonetheless, Trump’s move has renewed interest in the conflict. This gives the newly-established administration an opportunity to enact policies that effectively enhance security and human rights protection across the region. 

Since 1975, when Morocco began its occupation of the Western Sahara, the Sahrawi people have demanded the establishment of an independent Sahrawi state in Western Sahara, appealing to the principle of self-determination. Although Morocco claimed sovereignty over the region on the basis of its historical ties, its territorial claims carry no legal force, according to a 1974 International Court of Justice opinion. Prior to Spanish colonization, the Sahrawi people, who are indigenous to Western Sahara, were politically independent. In 1975, when Spain ceded control of the territory and Moroccan forces began their occupation of the territory, the Sahrawi people declared themselves an independent state, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Nonetheless, roughly 80 percent of Western Sahara remains under Moroccan occupation, while the remaining 20 percent of the territory is controlled by the self-proclaimed republic.

The new U.S. stance not only contrasts with that asserted by the UN — which called for the organization of a status referendum in the territory — but also compromises Washington’s credibility as a defender of the principle of self-determination and legitimizes illegal foreign occupation. The UN's position on the Western Sahara remains unchanged following President Trump’s policy about-face — while U.S. recognition of Moroccan control of the territory is deemed “incompatible with international law” by Jerry Matjila, South Africa’s ambassador to the UN. 

In sharp contrast with previous U.S. administrations, which tended to support the option of an autonomous Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty, President Trump effectively traded recognition of Moroccan control over the territory in exchange for Morocco’s normalization of ties with Israel in an apparent effort to cement his foreign policy legacy in the region. Perhaps more surprisingly, the decision to do so was likely unnecessary to achieve a normalization in Moroccan-Israeli relations, which could very well have happened without it as Israel already managed to normalize ties with Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Sudan just in 2020, adding to its already stable relations with Egypt and Jordan. 

While the United States’ recognition of Moroccan claims to the Western Sahara has the potential to escalate tensions in an already conflict-ridden region, it nonetheless brought international attention to a long-ignored conflict. In doing so, the Trump administration may have given President Joe Biden’s administration the initiative to demonstrate a recommitment to an American foreign policy grounded in respect for human rights.

The diplomatic and legal impropriety of the deal is self-evident, as it exchanges the recognition of an internationally recognized state for de jure recognition of exclusively de facto control of another in two entirely different contexts, unnecessarily linking two completely unrelated issues. James Baker III, a former U.S. Secretary of State and former special envoy for Western Sahara, warned that the implications of President Trump’s decision will be far-reaching, predicting that it risks “sending a message to the rest of the world that the non-acquisition of territory by force and the right of self-determination are pick-and-choose principles for the United States”.

If the mediating role of the U.S. is compromised, it is because President Trump’s move in Western Sahara achieved nothing but to speed up a process between Tel Aviv and Rabat that, in all likelihood, was already set in motion. Given the wave of Arab-Israeli normalization agreements pushed by President Trump this past year, Morocco, a major non-NATO American ally, would likely have established ties with Israel at some point, regardless of the U.S. position on the Sahrawi issue. 

Moroccan relations with Israel were historically warmer than those between Israel and most other Arab states, and even grew more amicable in the last few years, evidenced by the increased volume of trade exchange between the two countries and renewed contacts between their leaders. Although the Moroccan government traditionally maintained a pro-Palestinian stance, the issue of an independent Palestine is clearly subordinate not only to that of the Western Sahara, but also to the economic and geopolitical advantages that a normalization of relations with Israel entails.

President Trump’s decision is already stoking tensions in the broader region. Taking advantage of U.S. recognition of the Western Sahara, Saaededdine Othmani, the Moroccan Prime Minister, decided to push the issue of establishing Moroccan sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish enclaves in North Africa that Spain withheld in the aftermath of decolonization in an effort to control migratory flows to Europe from Africa. In response, Arancha González Laya, the Spanish Foreign Minister, not only called for respect for Spain’s territorial integrity, but also highlighted Spain’s support for UN engagement in the Western Sahara and for holding a referendum on the status of the territory. Though the UN formed a Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara in 1991, the referendum remains indefinite, limited by intense disagreement between Morocco and the Polisario Front — the political and paramilitary arm representing the Sahrawi people in support of an independent state in the Western Sahara —  over how the future vote should be conducted.

Trump’s arrangement also risks complicating Washington’s strategic relationship with Algeria, which is key to cooperation in American counter-terrorism efforts in North Africa. The Polisario Front also enjoys great benefits from its close relationship with the Algerian government, which has long provided it with arms equipment as well as economic and political support. The very survival of the Polisario Front is dependent on continued support from Algeria, which, according to a CIA leak, opted to support the Sahrawi movement both out of self-interest and a commitment to the principle of self-determination. Though Algeria’s sponsorship of the Sahrawi has long been a source of considerable tension with neighboring Morocco, Algiers consistently holds up the issue of self-determination as a matter of national values.

As a consequence of U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, other states may also withdraw their support for the Sahrawi people in tow behind Washington’s new stance, further complicating an already untenable situation in the region. Any further moves by the United States should at a minimum aim to avoid fomenting turmoil, given the omnipresent risk that Islamist groups — which, within Morocco, rejected normalizing ties with Israel — may exploit the situation to expand their influence in yet another conflict-prone region. The issue necessitates immense caution from all foreign actors, as religious militancy in the Sahel and Sahara regions remains volatile. Terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb maintain an active presence in the countries bordering Western Sahara. The creation of a power vacuum in the Western Sahara should be avoided at any cost, lest the world wish to see a Moroccan episode of terrorist expansion of the kind witnessed in Syria and Iraq between 2013 and 2019.

In the meantime, Rabat's human rights violations of the Sahrawi people continue unabated, and Morocco's occupation of Western Sahara persists. There is no reliable data concerning the demographic composition of Western Sahara, hence it is not known how many Sahrawi live in the occupied territories. Many of them fled to Algeria when the occupation started, and at least 90,000 Saharawi are vulnerable refugees living in the camps of Tindouf. This diaspora makes it difficult to account for all Sahrawi people and to hold the referendum with so many in absentia abroad. Morocco's occupation enables Rabat to control economic activities in the area. The Sahrawi have never been able to take advantage of the territory's vast resources: precious minerals, phosphate, iron, salt, and oil deposits buried under the Saharan sand, as well as some of the world’s most productive fish stocks off the territory’s coast. The history of Moroccan occupation in Western Sahara is one of resource appropriation, as the richness of the territory stirred up economic interests in the conflict.

Although the Polisario Front expressed hopes that the new Biden administration will retract U.S. recognition of Moroccan control over Western Sahara, Biden has yet to comment on the matter. If the Biden administration chooses to return U.S. foreign policy on the Western Sahara to that of the Obama administration, it will reinstate its support for a negotiated settlement while keeping the option of supporting an independent state on the table. Although establishing Western Saharan autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is generally seen as the most feasible way to resolve the issue, the proposal does not enjoy the support by the Sahrawi, who maintain their claim to complete independence, and would likely cause more conflict in the future. In short, a resolution of the conflict in the Western Sahara appears unlikely in the near future. Indeed, it would be counterproductive for the new administration to backpedal Trump’s decision in light of both the special relationship that the United States has with Morocco and the fact the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara underpins the peace deal with Israel.

Nonetheless, former President Trump’s actions offer President Biden with an important opportunity to demonstrate his new administration's human rights agenda in the Middle East, which envisages a sharp break with the last four years. Although Trump’s radical position on the Western Sahara broke with decades of U.S. policy and undermines Washington's role as a defender of human rights worldwide, it also shed light on a forgotten conflict that has been festering at the margins of international politics for nearly half a century. If President Biden is actually committed to promoting a human rights-centered foreign policy, Western Sahara represents an appropriate first arena to champion this commitment. 

Ideally, any subsequent moves should aim at safeguarding the security of the region and ensuring the protection of Sahrawi rights. So far, the path taken to implement the referendum has presented many difficulties, and the option desired by the Sahrawi independence has been discredited in light of the risk of creating a failed state. The issue needs oversight to avoid power vacuums, and a winner-takes-all approach would likely be ineffective no matter who comes out on top.

The effective safeguard of human rights in the area would be a major achievement for the Sahrawi — one that could go hand in hand with the implementation of security which, at the same time, would be advantageous for Rabat. Indeed, the major setback of MINURSO (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) is its lack of a mechanism for monitoring human rights abuses. Nonetheless, the West regards Mohammed V’s progressive policies favorably. In the light of the positive relationship that Morocco has with NATO, the implementation of ad-hoc international oversight with an eye to protecting human rights while promoting regional security against terrorist groups — could be a productive first step from which everyone could benefit. Regardless of the path that Washington takes, the fact that the Western Sahara is once again front and center in conversations over North Africa presents a unique window of opportunity for the Sahrawi. It must not be lost.


 

Lucrezia Ducci

Programme Assistant
Political Violence & Conflict Resolution Programme

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Edited by: Mark Dovich, Cameron Vaské


All views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of The International Scholar or any other organization.


Photo Credits:

  • Photo courtesy of Connor Schiedler on Unsplash.


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