Analysis | The Navalny Protests Highlight Putin’s Fraying Social Contract
Russia’s latest round of youth-driven protests are as much about the Russian economy as they are about Navalny and political freedoms. Putin’s social contract with the Russian public is fraying.
On January 23, mass protests erupted across Russia following the arrest of Alexei Navalny — a blogger and YouTuber who rose to stardom through his investigations into government corruption. Just days before, Navalny and his organization, the Anti-Corruption Foundation, published a video alleging that Russian President Vladimir Putin owns a massive palace worth more than $1 billion on the Black Sea coast. The video already boasts more than 100 million views on YouTube. Many of the Russians who took to the streets did so not only to support Navalny, but also out of anger over the revelations in the video.
Believed to be the largest protests in seven years, with participants in almost 200 cities and towns across Russia, the scale of the protests is unprecedented. Historic, too, was the violence police doled out to the demonstrators in response. Police detained more than 3,000 protesters over the course of the day — a record for one-day protester arrests, according to OVD-Info, a monitoring group. A second round of protests, held on January 31, saw even greater suppression, with over 5,000 protesters arrested.
The protests did not spring from nowhere; rather, they’ve grown possible after years of activist work and protests. The surge of opposition activism emerged most prominently during the last four years, as Russia’s economy stagnated and standards of living fell. Moscow's economic woes challenge the social contract Putin made with the Russian public when he first rose to power in the early 2000s. Seeing the 1990s as a decade of economic instability, decreased influence in foreign, and a loss of identity, many Russians were happy having a leader that returned a sense of stability.
“Moscow’s economic woes challenge the social contract Putin made with the Russian public when he first rose to power in the early 2000’s.”
In the 1990s, Russia’s GDP per capita declined rapidly, while unemployment increased exponentially. The swift privatization of state industries following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended up enriching oligarchs and created a climate of corruption, bribery, and inequality. Nonetheless, Putin's first two presidential terms saw Russia’s economy grow dramatically, benefitting both from reforms put into place shortly before his assumption of the presidency and several years of historically-high oil prices: between 1999 and 2008, “GDP grew by 94% and per capita GDP doubled.” As the Moscow Times put it, “Putin was incredibly lucky.”
Putin received the credit for overseeing the rapid economic growth in the early 2000s, brought “swagger” back to Russian foreign policy, and expelled oligarchs from politics. In the eyes of the Russian public, he fought against the corruption of the financial and political elite, restoring Russia’s national pride. As William Burns (longtime American diplomat in Russia and U.S. President Joe Biden’s appointee for CIA Director) stated, “[Putin] basically laid out a social contract for Russians which in effect was, 'you stay out of politics, that's my business. What I will ensure in return are rising standards of living.’” This social contract held for many years; recent protests underline that Putin's social contract is already significantly eroded.
The last few years brought economic stagnation to vast swathes of Russia: the country's economic growth remains about the same as in 2008, while the average Russian household income declined for the past six years straight. Russian youth suffer an unemployment rate three times the national average. It is no coincidence that they are also especially likely to view the system Putin built and controls as corrupt and illegitimate. Over half of Russians between the ages of 18 and 24 have expressed a desire to move abroad for permanent residence, according to the Levada Center, an independent pollster. Meanwhile, a 2020 survey of 3,000 young Russians by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace found that over half of them thought it was time for Putin to step down. With Putin already boasting more than 20 years in power, young people increasingly desire new leadership — either from within Putin’s regime, or outside of it . Putin is simply not the same figure for Russian youth that he is for the generation that emerged from the political instability of the 1990s.
Economic discontent served as the primary source of fuel for opposition activism in the past several years in Russia. On March 26, 2017, large anti-corruption protests occurred across Russia. As a key leader and organizer of these rallies, Navalny was front-and-center. Like this year's protests, the anti-corruption demonstrations of 2017 followed the release of a video by Navalny and his organization outlining corruption at the highest levels of the Russian government. Protests continued throughout 2018 and 2019, culminating in July and August of 2019 with the largest demonstrations in the country since 2011-2012.
In 2020, the city of Khabarovsk in Russia's remote Far East saw unprecedented, months-long protests took place over the arrest of the former governor, Sergei Furgal, who won an upset victory against a Kremlin-backed candidate in 2018 gubernatorial elections. The Khabarovsk protests are noteworthy not only due to their sustained nature, but also their location: discontent in the Far East could very well indicate that general dissatisfaction with the central government is spreading beyond the usual activist hotspots of Moscow and St. Petersburg and is “becoming truly local.”
“Increased attempts by the Kremlin to stifle political dissent and suppress political activism among Russian youth are calculated attempts to disguise crucial domestic weaknesses for Putin.”
The pro-Navalny protests of this January, then, are built upon years of persistent protests. Increased attempts by the Kremlin both to stifle political dissent and suppress political activism among Russian youth are calculated attempts to disguise crucial domestic weaknesses for Putin — the very shortcomings that these protests decry — in the form of large-scale corruption, the vast wealth gap between the Russian elite and the people, and economic stagnation.
The man whose name is at the center of the most recent protests, Navalny, has used social media to create a small, but growing, opposition movement — especially among young people. Unlike older generations, Russian youth find a majority of their information online — a space Navalny knows well as a blogger and YouTuber. Many of the protesters who came out in January were either inspired by social media or concerned over attempts to curb social media freedoms, and responded accordingly. It is estimated that more than 40 percent of the protesters were first-time attendees at a political demonstration.
The Kremlin appears to understand how important social media is in fueling protest movements, and already stated that authorities will fine seven social media sites that failed to take down pro-Navalny videos before the January 23 protests. The Russian state media regulator, Roskomnadzor, has also attempted to remove videos that promoted the protests, supposedly because they targeted minors. Despite these efforts, such videos have garnered hundreds of millions of views in recent days, with pro-Navalny hashtags being used more than 200 million times. Russians have also used social media during the protests to spread videos and photos of police violence, to which young Russians are especially sensitive. One video of a St. Petersburg woman being kicked in the stomach by a police officer sparked widespread outrage and has led to investigations of police brutality by city prosecutors. The woman remains in intensive care.
In an unsettling development for the country's political elite, Russians are also increasingly utilizing media sources outside of state control. For example, coverage of the protests on TV Rain, a small, independent channel, garnered 10 times more views than on RT, the government-controlled network. Russians also closely watched the protests occurring in neighboring Belarus and even co-opted some of the strategies used by the Belarusian protesters. Some Russian demonstrators during January’s protests even adopted the symbolic white-red-white flags and chants of "Zhyve Belarus" (meaning "long live Belarus" in Belarusian) long used by Belarusian critics of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka.
In this environment of stifled but persistent activism, a new generation of Russians has grown up who have only known Putin as their country's leader. Though young people in Russia are often seen as apolitical, they typically refrain from politics — not because they are content with the state of their country, but rather because they view protests and political action as risky and ineffective at bringing about change. As one young Russian stated, “I don’t see the point of talking about something you can’t influence...It’s better to know and be quiet. It’s better not to speak up.” However, Navalny's swift arrest upon his return to Russia, coupled with the release of the Black Sea palace video have seemingly “captivated many young Russians.” Navalny appeals to this new generation, who are “much more stubbornly fearless”, as Natalia Zorkaya, a sociologist with the Levada Center, put it.
It is hard to say how the protests will affect the apolitical disposition of many young Russians or how Navalny may capitalize on that discontent for his own political ends — especially if he remains imprisoned for years. What the pro-Navalny movement reveals, regardless, is the growing political momentum stemming from years of discontent and visible opposition protests. Activism is alive and well across Russia. Putin’s social contract is fraying, and a new media environment — rooted in social networks and consumed voraciously by young people — is helping hasten its end.
The harsh tactics used to dispel the protests also led to international condemnation. In a press statement, the U.S. State Department “strongly condemn[ed] the use of harsh tactics against protesters and journalists this weekend in cities throughout Russia.” Meanwhile, Dominic Raab, the UK Foreign Secretary, tweeted that London “condemns the Russian authorities’ use of violence against peaceful protesters and journalists.” Dozens of countries, including the United States, called for Navalny’s release. Unlike the previous three presidents, who entered office with the hope that they could reset relations with Russia, Biden holds no such illusions as to how far the U.S.-Russian relationship can stretch. The Biden administration was always going to be tough on Russia; Navalny’s arrest and the crackdown on protesters merely help justify the White House's stance. Biden’s position on Navalny’s arrest and the protests puts Putin in a strenuous negotiating position relative to Western sanctions, which have taken a clear toll on the Russian economy.
While it is unlikely that these protests will ultimately topple Putin, they are a sign that his appeal and influence with the Russian public Russia is not as stable as he would like to project. Though Putin is still the politician that most Russians would like to see in power, the opposition movement continues to establish itself. For Navalny, the strength and scope of the January protests were the fruit of years of grassroots work and activism. As the Economist wrote, “to oppose President Vladimir Putin requires not only charisma and clear vision but also physical stamina and courage. Alexei Navalny possesses these qualities in abundance.” Navalny mobilized the youth of Russia to give strength to his movement. If he wants to see his movement grow, he will need their support. And so far, he appears to be playing his hand well.
Edited by: Cameron Vaské
All views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of The International Scholar or any other organization.
Photo Credits:
Photo by Liza Pooor on Unsplash
