Analysis | The African Great Lakes Conflict is Boiling Over
Interconnected vectors across security, economic, cultural, and rhetorical fault-lines are keeping the African Great Lakes states in a state of perpetual conflict and instability — creating a vicious cycle that threatens to boil over throughout the region.
“Any mismanaged conflict has long-lasting consequences” - Simon de Bignicourt, 1755.
Beset by inter-ethnic violence, a growing refugee crisis, and natural resource exploitation, the situation in the African Great Lakes region is perhaps the most prominent illustration of Simon Bignicourt’s immortal words. Deeply interdependent, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) maintain a complicated network of shared social, political, and economic challenges — both internal and extraterritorial — that threaten to disrupt regional peace and security developments.
The multifaceted and interconnecting conflicts occurring among these neighboring states stem primarily from lingering issues borne from their respective colonial periods, as well as their geostrategic positioning relative to regional economic interests. When it comes to Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC, their shared roots of conflict are reflective of a possible collective path toward peace. To achieve sustainable peace-building measures and safeguard regional security efforts, there must be a significant shift in the way in which local politics address the major drivers of conflict, or else the countries in the Great Lakes region will continue to suffer from recurring conflicts with no true end in sight.
The deficit of governance combined with the inability of meager security services to address the multitude of armed groups spread across the vast expanse of the DRC — often propped up by other countries in the region — are just a few of the many factors contributing to an infernal, vicious cycle of conflict in the Great Lakes region.
Shared Post-Colonial Pitfalls
The complicated history of colonial construction in Africa’s Great Lakes is reflected in the nature of the post-independence challenges that continue to afflict the region’s states, lending credence to the belief that history does indeed repeat itself. At first united under German East Africa-1885, Rwanda and Burundi were then subjected to Belgian control and later attached loosely to the DRC until its own declaration of independence. It was not until 1962 that Rwanda and Burundi – coined Ruanda-Urundi at the time – officially separated into two distinct sovereign states.
Prior to their separation, European colonization in the trusteeships of Rwanda and Burundi furthered the pre-existing divide between the countries’ two main ethnic groups, the Tutsis and Hutus. In an effort to subjugate the majority Hutu population, Belgian rulers adopted more divisive public policies that concentrated power in the hands of the Tutsi elite, who they viewed as more fit to rule. This included issuing government-mandated identity cards that indicated an individuals’ ethnic affiliation, as well as restricting access to quality education and all but eliminating opportunities for political engagement or participation.
For some, it remains debatable as to whether the Belgian administration’s strategy of fractionalization was undertaken for the sole purpose of consolidating power and establishing authority over the local populations in both Rwanda and Burundi. Be that as it may, the radicalization of ethnic cleavage was the primary cause for the social upheaval that resulted in the systematic murder of approximately 800,000 individuals in Rwanda — mostly Tutsis — by Hutu extremists. The aftershocks of the Rwandan genocide were felt in Burundi and the DRC, marking the start of the three states’ tight-knit, but tumultuous, relationship.
A Threefold Refugee Crisis
The interconnected relationship between Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC extends far beyond their colonial roots. Massive bouts of ethnicized violence resulted in an influx of refugees, primarily in the DRC, which was the go-to destination for those fleeing persecution during the Rwandan genocide. In line with international law, Congolese President Mobutu Sese Seko opened the country’s borders to welcome thousands of refugees, many of whom eventually settled in the provinces of North and South Kivu in Eastern DRC. In perhaps his most memorable course of action, Mobutu also opened the borders to thousands of Hutus with known and alleged links to the armed forces of the Rwandan regime responsible for the genocide. Mobutu’s decision constitutes one of the most important stages in the interconnection of contemporary conflict in the Great Lakes region.
The number of Rwandan refugees in the DRC is now estimated at 213,974 individuals. The issue of refugee intake has been a constant thorn in relations between the DRC and Rwanda, which recently culminated in a proverbial tug-of-war between the latter's insistence on implementing the cessation clause relative to revoking the refugee status from all those who fled the country as a result of the genocide. The decision by the Rwandan government can be interpreted as a means of pressuring refugees to return to their home countries, especially those belonging to the parties that both Rwanda and the DRC associate with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), one of the last Hutu rebel groups based in eastern DRC that actively opposes Tutsi rule. The continued presence of the FDLR and the large number of refugees that remain on Congolese soil continue to poison relations between Rwanda and the DRC, acting as the greatest hindrance to development and peace-building initiatives in the Great Lakes region.
At the same time, relations between Burundian refugees — who fled violence in their home country in 2015 following the disputed re-election of President Pierre Nkurunzinza — and local communities in the DRC remain tense. Congolese populations living in the poverty-stricken area of Lusenda in Eastern DRC faced expropriation of their fields by the DRC government, where access to humanitarian assistance remained exclusive to refugees. The presence of a training camp for Burundian rebels in the village of Kabembwe, north of the Burundian refugee camps in Lusenda, not only exacerbates relations between Congolese people and Burundian refugees, but also creates a climate of mistrust between Congolese and Burundian authorities.
Today, the refugee crisis in the Great Lakes region is beyond critical, despite some encouraging developments such as the peaceful transfer of power in Burundi following the May 2020 general elections, enabling the return of Burundian refugees from Rwanda and Tanzania. While decreased violence in the region allowed for the repatriation of some 35,000 internationally displaced peoples to the DRC, peace remains a distant dream as the hostilities continue. As of January 2006, the United Nations Refugee Agency estimated that there were still approximately 42,000 Rwandan refugees, 5,000 Congolese refugees, and 19,000 Burundian refugees living in the DRC.
A Quest for Regional Leadership
Considered a strong and affable leader, Congolese President Mobutu’s geopolitical interests depended on the political and social stability of all nine of the DRC’s neighbors. His supposed alliance with the West — chiefly with the United States — in the fight against Communism in Africa obscured the dictatorial nature of his rule for more than three decades, affording him the opportunity to grossly interfere in the internal policies of his neighbors in the Great Lakes region, particularly Burundi and Rwanda. Mr. Mobutu long supported Mr. Habyarimana, the former Rwandan President, throughout his dictatorship, and even lent him his army to help fight a Tutsi insurrection in 1990.
In the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, Communism no longer posed a threat to Westerners and, by consequence, neither did its burgeoning expansion in Central Africa. For Western countries, supporting Mobutu was now no longer strategically advantageous. On April 29, 1997, given a successful advance by RDFL rebels into Eastern DRC, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited the capital city of Kinshasa, where he advised Mobutu that this was his last chance to step down from his role as President with honor and dignity.
In the wake of Mobutu’s departure a month later, a struggle for power and influence ensued among the remaining leaders in Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC, which further fueled an already raging fire of conflict in the Great Lakes region which still continues to burn.
In search of power and influence, Rwanda has pursued an aggressive foreign policy towards its neighbors. Through the use of its armed forces and military support, has supported armed groups, at least until 2013 Rwandan troops Rwandan troops occupied much of the DRC from 1998 to 2002.
Rwanda often complains about the presence on Congolese territory of rebels hostile to its power.
In the past, Rwandan leaders regularly accused the DRC of sheltering rebels hostile to Rwanda within its borders, and frequently referred to the Rights of Hot Pursuit — an international law that allows the military forces of a State to pursue beyond its borders (on sea or on land) the perpetrators of a crime. This situation creates not only a continuous loop of accusation, but also fosters a climate of mistrust between the countries in the region. Cross-border dialogue intended to pacify parties in the region is characterized by accusations of hypocrisy and fails to focus on directly addressing core interests.
Economic Interests At Odds
Another principal driver of conflict that further hinders peace-building efforts is the exploitation of natural resources. The value of natural resources and minerals such as gold and petroleum in the Democratic Republic of Congo alone is estimated at $24 trillion. Of this, a huge proportion is concentrated in Eastern DRC, now identified as the epicenter of conflict.
The Congo's destabilization and porous borders facilitate mineral trafficking to Rwanda and Burundi, which benefit from the violence in eastern DRC.
In 2012, the British NGO Global Witness noted that Congolese gold, cassiterite and coltan continue to be mined by various armed groups and then fraudulently exported to Rwanda, which re-exports them as Rwandan minerals.
The systematic link between the exploitation of natural resources and the financing of the Congolese conflict was established in the early 2000s within a UN Security Council mandated report on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the DRC.
With what are now essentially open borders, illicit trade in arms in the Great Lakes region is inevitable and commonplace. As it stands, small arms and light weapons flow along the same channels as minerals, albeit in the opposite direction; a trade which, to some extent, explains the increase in the number of armed groups in the region functioning independently or with passive and sometimes active support of third party states. Most notably, Rwanda and Uganda politically and militarily continue to support armed movements in the DRC and facilitate the illegal exploitation of the Congo's natural resources. While difficult, fortification efforts of the more than 1,215-kilometer-long border with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi will be key to controlling the movement of minerals and weapons.
Despite several initiatives at the regional and international level, the Great Lakes region is struggling to stabilize and is in a kind of vicious circle of conflict characterized by armed violence and insecurity.
Why the status quo?
Flagging governance and rule of law in the DRC is one of the main problems plaguing the country. Corruption and the misappropriation of funds from taxes, money from resource trafficking and international aid have plunged the majority of Congolese into great poverty, causing the population to lose confidence in its leaders. The Congolese authority is almost absent in several entities in the east of the country, leaving the population living in these areas at the mercy of armed groups. With the absence of the Congolese army and police in these areas, armed groups have become the sole providers of security and administrative services.
That security has been left to the hands of armed groups in areas stretching the 755 mile (1215 km) border shared with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi can only be of concern.
The conflict continues because of the weakness of the Congolese government's armed forces, which are struggling to secure the DRC's borders with its neighbors and to put an end to armed groups in the eastern part of the country. Principal among these challenges are:
The restructuring of the Congolese army, notably through "mixage" and "brassage", which has seen former rebels and militia integrated into the Congolese army-FARDC, has simply been a matter of putting together men with weapons and divergent interests, sometimes without adequate training. Military officers are more concerned with business in the eastern part of the country than with security and the fight against armed groups, and some officers are accused of collaborating with armed groups in the east.
The consequence of this complacency or weakness of the Congolese army in its fight against national and foreign armed groups is the continued presence of foreign armed groups-ADF, LRA (Ugandan), FDLR (Rwandan), FNL (Burundian), as well as the proliferation of national armed groups. The continued presence of these national and foreign armed groups is now one of the major reasons for the continuing cycle of conflict and violence and the deterioration of relations between the countries of the region.
Rwanda accuses Burundi and Uganda of supporting Rwandan rebels active in eastern DRC and often threatens to respond to attacks by these groups against its country. Burundi and Uganda, on the other hand, claim that Rwanda is supporting Burundian and Ugandan rebels in the DRC. The DRC has repeatedly accused Rwanda of supporting rebellions on its territory.
Recommendations and conclusion
To succeed the stabilization of the Great Lakes region and break the cycle of conflict in this region, concrete actions must be taken at the local, regional and international levels.
At the national level
The authorities of the Democratic Republic of Congo must re-establish the authority of the state throughout the country by putting an end to armed groups. To achieve this, they must put an end to impunity and build a republican, well-trained, well-equipped and well-paid army, while ensuring that the leaders of armed groups are no longer rewarded with higher ranks and functions within the army after negotiations.
This practice of integrating elements of the armed groups into the Congolese army each time has not only weakened it, but is also at the root of the increase in the number of armed groups. The fact that the Congolese government often gives positions to the leaders of armed groups in exchange for their disarmament has led many other people to create their own armed groups in order to obtain positions and ranks in the army from the government after negotiation.
At the regional level
Peaceful coexistence among the peoples of Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC is also essential. To achieve this, peace initiatives should be based on factors considered to be "unifying" between the three countries. These include the following:
The geographical proximity to liquid borders such as Lake Kivu between Rwanda and the DRC and Lake Tanganyika between Burundi and the DRC, both of which are hotspots for fishing.
The common language of Swahili, which is spoken in all three states and is widely used in cross-border trade
At the international level
The international community through the US and France, two UN Security Council members with experience in the Great Lakes region, must dissuade the countries of the region from abandoning mutual support for armed groups and encourage them to engage in sincere dialogue for the stability of the region. The normalization of relations between France and Rwanda on the one hand and the European Union and Burundi on the other is an opportunity that must be capitalized on by the international community to demand that the countries of the region abandon their support for armed groups and encourage them to engage in sincere dialogue.
If the DRC does not equip itself with strong and credible security services, training and equipping its military and police well to douse the conflict within its borders, or Uganda and Rwanda fail to engage sincerely and transparently in peace initiatives in the region — particularly by abandoning their support for armed groups in Eastern DRC — and especially if the illegal mineral trade in Eastern DRC is not halted, the vicious circle of conflict in the Great Lakes region cannot be broken. Worse, it is likely to grow even more violent, threatening to boil over in yet another mass crisis for the region.
Edited by: Diana Roy and Cameron Vaské
All views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of The International Scholar or any other organization.
Photo Credit:
Visit to the Democratic Republic of Congo | Kinshasa, 31 May 2019 by Paul Kagame, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0, https://www.flickr.com/photos/paulkagame/47973145123
