Argument | Time's Up to Figure out the EU-Russian Relationship
Russia’s April military build-up betrays its designs on European partners in Ukraine, and demonstrates a determination to continue its asymmetric assault on Ukraine and Eastern Europe at large. The time is now or never for European policymakers to decide how to respond to Russia’s continued expansionism.
As became clear from the build-up of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine early in April, Moscow is determined to upend the military stalemate in the Donbass region and Crimea in its favor to consolidate the territorial gains it made in its original invasion in 2014. The conflict, which began as a result of Russia’s attempt to annex a large portion of the Ukraine, has since cost the lives of more than 14,000 people since 2014. Diplomatic efforts remain at an impasse, as the majority of the world refuses to recognize the proxy states Russia created in the wake of its invasion.
According to European and Eurasian Affairs Acting Assistant Secretary Philip Reeker, “more Russian forces massed on those borders [in the last few weeks] than at anytime since 2014 when Russia first invaded Ukraine.” While U.S. President Joe Biden might have given Russian President Vladimir Putin a political edge after suggesting a meeting “in the coming months,” the Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu, unexpectedly announced on Thursday, the 23rd of April that Russia would recall its troops. The final tally of Russian troops on Ukraine’s border, as Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba relayed reporters, was believed to be as high as 120,000.
During the buildup and mobilization of Russia’s military forces, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky regularly spoke with the heads of EU institutions, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron, and even American Secretary of State Antony Blinken at NATO headquarters in Brussels. The flurry of discussions with Western partners was a direct attempt to deter further Russian aggression against the Ukraine, which Moscow characterized as “not threatening.” Despite Moscow’s pleas to the contrary, dozens of Members of the European Parliament — including a great number of those hailing from Central Eastern Europe and the Baltic states — signed a joint statement on April 2nd in which they reiterated their appeal to the international community and expressed the EU’s disapproval of Russia’s violation of the Minsk agreements and the ceasefire.
The combined appeals and actions from within EU institutions go to demonstrate that Europe and its allies are done tolerating this kind of behavior from Russia — a point not lost on Moscow, and one that likely decisively contributed to the decision to withdraw.
While the Pentagon closely observed the situation with a renewed commitment to preserving European security architecture, the incoherence in European foreign policy showed Putin that there is yet considerable room to maneuver, even if this latest incident was merely an unwelcome show of Russia flexing its military might. After all, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is close to completion; Sputnik V vaccine exports have pit Member States and institutions against one another; and Russia’s role in Nagorno-Karabakh, Belarus, and other unresolved conflicts in the region remain largely unaddressed. In this geopolitical penumbra, Kyiv's concerns over the lack of an immediate response to what then appeared a clear and present threat to Ukraine’s already corroded territorial integrity were well-justified.
When the EU first imposed sanctions on Russia over the Ukraine crisis in March of 2014, the expansion of existing sanctions was made in response to the deaths of 211 European nationals in a plane shot down by a Russian missile fired from separatist territory in Ukraine — not in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea. The EU’s response sends entirely the wrong message. So long as Russia believes that its military presence in Ukraine – past, present, or future – solely earns Moscow a call from Berlin and Paris to scale back its personnel, it has no need to be worried over further countermeasures as long as it avoids imperiling European citizens.
After the annexation of Crimea, Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings reached record level of 89% in June of 2015. To contain ongoing protests and legitimize Putin’s rule, which could last until 2036, the Kremlin may elect to further flex its military might in the Ukraine in an attempt to both consolidate its gains there, as well as to produce a ‘wag the dog’ effect at home. Russia is even likelier to consider this course of action if it operates under the assumption that the EU is unlikely to counter its actions if that means endangering EU economic interests. Russia received the greatest number of Schengen visas in the 2020, with more than 4 million visa applications, and Europe's dependency on Russian raw materials — particularly oil and gas — remains entrenched. While Russia continues to suffer the heavy weight of sanctions, their effect is mostly limited to individual persons and legal entities, rather than the Russian economy as whole.
As if this were not evidence enough, the Council of Europe allowed the Russian delegation to return to the Parliamentary Assembly in 2019, and its former role in the Normandy Format, and the OSCE’s working groups is largely unscathed. At present, the disunity amongst EU Member States and the purchase of Sputnik V vaccine doses seem to suggest that Russia has very little to lose by continuing to act out in the East.
While the Biden administration expressed support for Ukrainian territorial integrity and provided tools to Kyiv to aid its efforts in securing its borders, the EU is far better geographically positioned and practically equipped to respond to rapidly evolving developments and potential ceasefire violations near Ukraine’s borders. But, will it?
The answer is a maybe. Some 45 percent of Central and Eastern European citizens share the view that NATO causes Russia to feel “entrapped,” and is responsible for its subsequent aggressive posturing. Some 56 percent do not consider Russia a threat. With a such a hodgepodge of public opinion along its border with Russia, the EU appears to be caught at a crossroads. Would more decisive action have even been approved of — much less sought — if the recent standoff had escalated as many feared? While Russian encroachment on European borders is not unthinkable, and most bordering states remain cognizant of that fact, the potential for political fallout might have some European leaders second-guessing defensive action to protect a non-EU ally.
The sequence of events that transpired in the two weeks of the military buildup allowed the newly minted Biden administration to demonstrate its more assertive and definite approach to Russia as distinct from former President Trump’s amicable and indefinite personal relationship with President Putin. It also granted the Kremlin the opportunity to craft an appealing narrative that might help it stabilize falling public opinion if carefully executed. Furthermore, it forced Central and Eastern European countries to re-evaluate their pro-Western attitudes in the light of decision to allow Russian vaccine distribution in the EU — despite the clear conflict of interests it presents.
Questions and theories abound as to Russia’s decision to escalate at this time — and still more over its decision to withdraw. Some argue the exercise was meant to send a clear message to the Biden administration that Russia is both capable and willing to make good on its promises of geopolitical superiority. Others claim it an attempt to secure a water supply to Crimea after it was severed by Ukraine post-annexation. Still more contest it was simply meant to further consolidate its sphere of influence over the region. Yet, regardless of the Kremlin's motives, Europe's lackluster response not only put the EU’s reputation at stake, but also brought into question the former Soviet bloc’s belief in Atlanticism as integral to Europeanism in the face of Russia.
Following High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell’s trip to Moscow in February earlier this year, it was concluded that the EU needs to "push back, contain and engage" with Russia. Yet, this “selective engagement” on matters of converging interest has clearly given Russia mixed signals.
After the informal meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers on 19 April, the HR/VP Borrell said that the EU was not planning on imposing new sanctions on Russia while the number of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border continued to rise. However, with the United States amenable to putting greater pressure on Russia, Europe should not forego this opportunity — one it has not enjoyed since 2016. The European Union must either re-draw the red line in its relationship with Moscow with the support of Washington, or accept the possibility that the security status-quo could rapidly shift — and not in the EU’s favor.
For the Union to be successful in containing this “strategic challenge,” it will need to coordinate its policies with the United States, Canada, Turkey, and other NATO and non-NATO allies. EU Member States will need to demonstrate real support for the countries of the Eastern Partnership that translate into tangible results. Brussels must also shore up its credibility as a foreign policy actor, making clear to Moscow that the Minsk Agreements are not re-negotiable and the foreign policy commitments that leave Brussels are ironclad.
Ahead of the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Putin’s advisor Sergey Glazyev stated that “Russia could no longer guarantee Ukraine's status as a state.” European countries largely dismissed this comment on the grounds of lacking credibility. In early April 2021, Dimitrij Kozak, deputy head of the Putin’s administration warned that this conflict might signal a "beginning of the end." Yet again, the response from Europe was underwhelming.
The COVID-19 pandemic caused European countries to make larger cuts to the defense sector in the Multi-annual Financial Framework for 2021-27 than initially proposed by the Commission, sidelining Europe’s efforts to foster strategic autonomy in the area of security. However, recent developments in the East demonstrated clearly that a scenario in which Russia aggressively pursues its territorial ambitions is no longer a hypothetical, and that the EU needs to be prepared for that contingency. Even as Ukraine continues to breathe a sigh of relief following the de-escalation of the conflict, Russia’s next move may assume one (or more) of many forms, from military escalation to cyberattacks.
It would be a mistake of continental proportions to underestimate Russia for a second time in the face of both clear and present threats to Europe's security and that of its allies. If ever the EU wanted its members to back greater investment of resources and political will towards the development of lasting solutions for Europe’s own defense, the time is now.
Edited by: Cameron Vaské
All views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of The International Scholar or any other organization.
Photo Credit:
By Mil.ru, CC BY 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=47332373
